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Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the Death
Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices
In 1910, Justice McKenna, writing for the United States Supreme Court,
stated that the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
"is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice."1 The Court has applied this progres-
sive standard to the death penalty only in the last two decades. 2 During this
time the Court has required the nonarbitrary imposition of the death penalty,3
disallowed automatic death sentences,4 and categorically prohibited the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on those convicted of crimes other than murder.5
The Court twice has ruled directly on the constitutionality of the imposition
of the death penalty on defendants who were not the actual killers, but were
convicted of first degree murder by means of the felony murder doctrine.6 In
Enmund v. Florida7 the Court enunciated what was deemed a categorical prohi-
bition of capital punishment of defendants convicted under the felony murder
doctrine8 who did not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force ... be employed." 9 The recent Supreme Court opinion in Tison
v. Arizona 10 limited the Enmund holding by declaring that when the felony
murder defendant has actively participated in the underlying felony and has
evinced a "reckless indifference towards human life," regardless of whether the
defendant possessed an intent to kill, the death penalty is not disproportionate to
the crime, and therefore not cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment.I
This Note traces the recent history of the death penalty in the Supreme
Court, particularly those cases dealing with the imposition of the death penalty
on felony murder defendants. The Note then questions the Tison Court's pur-
ported consistency with Enmund by exposing a stark contrast in the Court's
rationales and conclusions in these two cases. Finally, the Note discusses the
mens rea requirement of "reckless indifference" provided in Tison, concluding
that because this standard is too broad, it allows the death penalty to be arbitrar-
ily applied to nontriggerman12 felony murderers.
The recent history of the death penalty begins in 1972, with the landmark
1. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
2. The first case to apply this progressive standard to the death penalty was Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
3. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
5. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 534 (1977).
6. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
7. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
8. See Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 697 (1986) (enunciating the Enmund rule).
9. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
10. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
11. Id. at 1688.
12. "Nontriggerman" is a term used by the courts to denote one convicted of murder under the
felony murder doctrine who did not do the actual killing, regardless of the means used to kill.
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case of Furman v. Georgia, 13 in which the Court delivered a clear message to the
states: the death penalty as applied in 1972 constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the eighth amendment.' 4 The lowest common denominator
found in the five concurring opinions in Furman was the idea that because there
was no procedural basis for deciding which capital defendants should receive the
,death penalty, the penalty was imposed in an arbitrary manner and left too
much to the whims and prejudices of the sentencer.15 Absent a procedural
structure, juries were prone to apply the death penalty discriminatorily and
excessively. 16
Four years after Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia, 17 the Supreme Court de-
clared that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se when applied with
procedural safeguards to "the most extreme of crimes."' Is The Court stated,
"When a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the
punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime."' 19 Gregg interpreted
Furman as mandating that the sentencer's discretion must be "suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion."'20 The Gregg Court thus approved a sentencing scheme under which the
jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one out of ten speci-
fied aggravating circumstances. 2 ' The Georgia statute also authorized the jury
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Each of the nine justices wrote a separate opinion.
14. Id. at 239-40.
15. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. "'[T]here is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence... follow[s] discriminatory
patterns. The death sentence is disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro,
and the members of unpopular groups.'" Id. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 143 (1967)); see also id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The outstand-
ing characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infrequency with
which we resort to it."); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("iT]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not."). Justices Brennan and Marshall steadfastly maintained their belief that the death
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances. Id. at 285-86 (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring). Brennan noted, "Death, quite simply, does not
comport with human dignity." Id. at 305. Brennan considered human dignity to be the primary
principle underlying the eighth amendment. Id. at 281.
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court reviewed not only Georgia's imposition of the death pen-
alty pursuant to its revised statute, but that of four other states as well. Proffitt v. Alabama, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
18. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
19. Id. (footnote omitted). The Gregg Court declined to address the issue whether the death
penalty could be imposed constitutionally on one convicted of rape. Id. at 187 n.35. That question
was addressed one year later in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
21. The ten aggravating circumstances were as follows:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for capital felony, or the offense of murder was
committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated bat-
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to consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 22
Thus the jury must consider "the circumstances of the crime and the criminal
before it recommends sentence."'23
North Carolina responded to Furman by imposing the death penalty on all
persons convicted of either first-degree rape or first-degree murder,24 thus elimi-
nating any arbitrariness. In Woodson v. North Carolina 25 the United States
Supreme Court rejected all statutes mandating a death sentence for those con-
victed of a specified crime. The Court found three "constitutional shortcom-
ings" inherent in a mandatory death sentence scheme.26 First, the Court noted
a societal repudiation of automatic death sentences.27 The Court based this con-
clusion on "two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting
the imposition of punishment in our society-jury determinations and legislative
tery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the com-
mission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly cre-
ated a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon
or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solici-
tor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official
duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggra-
vated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
22. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975). The jury need not find mitigating circumstances in
order to recommend a lesser punishment than death. Id. § 27-2302.
23. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197. Automatic appeal was also provided for: the state supreme court
was required to assess the proportionality of the death penalty by comparing the crime committed to
other sentences imposed for the same, greater, and lesser crimes. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)
(1975); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204. The court similarly affirmed the death penalty and its procedural
application in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 249 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Florida used a system similar to that used in Georgia. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253. The Texas proce-
dure differed in that the jury was required to find that each of three aggravating circumstances
existed beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose the death penalty. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
Mitigating circumstances could be considered, although none were enumerated. Id. at 276.
24. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1976). Under North Carolina law, first-
degree murder included felony murder. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (current ver-
sion at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986)). Woodson had been convicted under the felony murder
statute, for he was not the actual killer, and had in fact been threatened with death by his accom-
plices if he failed to participate in the underlying felony, a robbery. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 283-84.
The Court did not address the felony murder issue.
25. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
26. Id. at 303.
27. Id. at 295.
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enactments." 28 Second, the Court concluded that, rather than checking unbri-
dled jury discretion in sentencing, mandatory death sentences induced arbitrary
conviction of those individuals charged with capital offenses, 29 because often
juries would be "deterred from rendering guilty verdicts because of the enormity
of the sentence automatically imposed."' 30 Third, the Court discussed the failure
of the North Carolina statute to allow the "particularized consideration of rele-
vant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant. ' 31 The
Court deemed this individualized consideration a "constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."'32
One year after Gregg, in Coker v. Georgia, 33 the Supreme Court categori-
cally prohibited the use of the death penalty for individuals convicted of rape,34
even when aggravating circumstances are found.35 The Court concluded that
American society had largely repudiated the imposition of the death penalty on
rapists, for Georgia was the only state at that time permitting the death penalty
for rape.36 Also, nine of every ten Georgia juries had rejected the death penalty
for that crime.37 The Court further reasoned that, popular sentiment aside, the
death penalty is simply excessive for the crime of rape, in which no life is
taken. 38
In 1978, in Lockett v. Ohio,39 the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving
the imposition of the death penalty on an individual convicted of felony murder.
The Court ultimately rejected Lockett's death sentence because the Ohio death
penalty statute failed to permit "the type of individualized consideration of miti-
gating factors [now held] to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 4 In concurring opinions, however, Justices Blackmun and White
debated the issue whether specific intent should be required for imposition of a
death sentence. The defendant, Sandra Lockett, had acted as driver of the get-
away car while her three accomplices robbed a pawnshop, a robbery which she
helped plan.41 During the robbery, the owner of the shop was killed in a scuf-
28. Id. at 293.
29. Id. at 302.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 303.
32. Id. at 304.
33. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
34. Id. at 598 ("We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which is 'unique in its
severity and irrevocability,' . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life." (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187)).
35. Coker, 433 U.S. at 599; see also id. at 601 (interpreting the majority as holding "that capital
punishment always-regardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of
rape") (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell disagreed with the
breadth of the holding, id., as did Chief Justice Burger, id. at 606 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),
36. Id. at 596. Florida also authorized capital punishment for the rape of children. Id.
37. Id. at 597.
38. Id. at 597-98 ("Rape is without a doubt deserving of serious punishment, but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.").
39. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. at 589-91.
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fle.4 2 The Ohio trial court sentenced Lockett to death under the felony murder
doctrine as codified in the Ohio statutes.43
Justice White stated in his concurrence, "[Ilt violates the Eighth Amend-
ment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant pos-
sessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim." 44 He sharply questioned the
deterrent effect of a penalty inflicted for crimes requiring no intent.45 Justice
White also statistically reviewed those states that permitted the imposition of the
death penalty under circumstances similar to those in Lockett, as well as the
number of times such a death sentence was actually imposed under similar
facts.46 He found that although approximately one half of the states had not
"legislatively foreclosed the possibility" of the death sentence under such cir-
cumstances, in only six cases had a court actually imposed the death penalty
under similar circumstances. 47 Finally, Justice White noted the traditional legal
principle that one who acts with a purpose to destroy human life is possessed of
a greater degree of culpability than one who does not.48
Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice White that the death penalty would
have been excessive in Lockett's case because she was convicted on the felony
murder theory and nothing more.49 Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice
White's reasoning, however, and argued that a lack of intent should not neces-
sarily preclude the imposition of the death penalty. 50 He stated that the sen-
tencer should evaluate both "the degree of [the] defendant's participation
leading to the homicide and the character of the defendant's mens rea."15 1 Justice
42. Id. at 590.
43. Id. at 593-94.
44. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White sharply
disagreed with the plurality's holding, stating, "The Court has now completed its about face since
[Furman]." Id. at 622 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He cited two propor-
tionality tests from Coker-whether the punishment makes a "'measurable contribution towards
acceptable goals of punishment,'" and whether the punishment is" 'grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.'" Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592).
45. Id. at 625 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 626 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's position was
not altogether removed from that of Justice White. Justice Blackmun found Ohio's statutory defini-
tion of "purposefulness," in including reckless endangerment, "allow[ed] for a particularly harsh
application of the death penalty to any defendant who has aided or abetted [in a felonyj in the
course of which a person is killed, even though accidentally." Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Thus, he did not consider recklessness alone enough to warrant a death sentence. Moreover, his
examples of felony murders that may warrant the death penalty despite an absence of intent to kill,
consisted of homicides in which, without intending to, the defendant becomes the actual killer:
What if a defendant personally commits the act proximately causing death by pointing a
loaded gun at the robbery victim, verbally threatens to use fatal force, admittedly does not
intend to cause a death, yet knowingly creates a high probability that the gun will dis-
charge accidentally? What if a robbery participant, in order to avoid capture or even for
wanton sport, personally and deliberately uses grave physical force with conscious intent to
inflict serious bodily harm, but not to kill, and a death results?
Id. at 614 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Blackmun doubted, however, that the Court could apply to felony murder "a
convincing bright-line rule such as was used in regard to rape."'5 2
In 1982 the Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida 53 confronted the issue
"whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take
life."'54 The facts of Enmund were similar to those in Lockett. Enmund acted as
getaway driver while his armed accomplices approached a residence and de-
manded money from an elderly man.55 The man called for his wife, who came
with a gun and shot one of the accomplices. The accomplices then subdued and
killed the couple, took their money, and fled, with Enmund driving the getaway
car.
56
Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court, using many of the same
arguments he had in Lockett. As in Lockett, White found it unnecessary to deal
with the issue whether defendant's degree of participation in the murder had
been sufficient to warrant the death penalty.57 Rather, he focused on the pro-
portionality of the death sentence on one who neither killed nor intended to
killY8
The Court's evaluation of proportionality surveyed the number of jurisdic-
tions that permitted the death penalty for a nontriggerman felony murderer who
had not intended the death of the victim. The Court concluded that, of the
thirty-six jurisdictions then authorizing the death penalty, only eight allowed the
death penalty to be imposed "solely because the defendant somehow partici-
pated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was committed."59 Nine
more states authorized the death penalty for a nontriggerman felony murderer
lacking intent only when sufficient aggravating circumstances outweighed any
mitigating circumstances. 60 The remaining jurisdictions would not permit the
imposition of the death penalty upon a nontriggerman felony murderer who
acted without intent that a killing take place. The opinion also discussed the
other indicator of societal rejection: the number of times a jury had actually
used the power given it by state law to sentence a nontriggerman defendant to
death absent a showing of intent.61 The Court's survey again revealed only six
of 362 cases in which a death sentence had been imposed on a nontriggerman
who had no intent to kill.62
52. Id. at 614 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
54. Id. at 787.
55. Id. at 784.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 787 n.4.
58. Id. at 787.
59. Id. at 792. The states were California, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id. at 789 n.5.
60. Id. at 791. That list included Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Id. at 792 nn.12-13.
61. Id. at 794. This indicator of societal rejection was discussed in Coker, 433 U.S. at 594, and
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
62. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794. All six of these executions had taken place in 1955. Id. at 794-
95. An even smaller number of like defendants was discovered on death row. Id. at 795.
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The Court next discussed whether the death penalty was excessive for the
crime of felony murder absent both an actus reus and a mens rea. The Court
first analyzed the culpability of a robber, noting that Enmund's conduct con-
sisted solely of participation in a robbery.63 The Court then stated that, like
rape," '[robbery] by definition does not include the death of . . . another
person.' "64
The Court defended this analysis by noting the insistence in Lockett on an
"individualized consideration [of culpability] as a constitutional requirement in
imposing the death sentence." 6 5 Such individualized consideration would not
permit Enmund to be treated in the same manner as those who actually killed
because he was plainly less culpable. 66
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor 67 argued that the majority's comparison of
rape with robbery-felony murder68 failed to take into account the disparate
harm caused by each.69 She reasoned that "proportionality ... involves the
notion that the magnitude of the punishment must be related to the degree of
harm inflicted on the victim, as well as to the degree of defendant's blameworthi-
ness." °70 In this way, Justice O'Connor distinguished Coker, in which life had
not been taken, from Enmund, in which life had been taken. O'Connor also
questioned the statistics the majority used in finding that "society has rejected
conclusively the death penalty for felony murderers. '7 1 She noted that the ma-
jority did not have data regarding the percentage of cases in which a jury had
refused to impose the death penalty on a nontriggerman felony murderer.7 2 She
then stated that even if the majority's statistics were valid, "they may only re-
flect that sentencers are especially cautious in imposing the death penalty." 73
In 1986 the Supreme Court held in five-four decision, Cabana v. Bullock 74
that the required Enmund finding that the defendant either intended to kill,
attempted to kill, or in fact did kill, need not be made by the jury or other
sentencing authority, but may be made at any point in the state's process of
63. Id. at 798.
64. Id. at 797 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598).
65. Id. at 798 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605); see also Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (Court must
focus on "relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender").
66. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
67. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehn-
quist, making Enmund a 5-4 decision. See id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
69. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); See generally Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm:
Balancing the Factors Upon Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C.L. REv. 283 (1988)
(discussing three potential aspects of any felony-harm, culpability, and dangerousness-and relat-
ing them to the goals of legal punishment-retribution, deterrence, restraint, and reformation).
71. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 818-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 820 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This argument was rejected in Furman. Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. 474 U.S. 376 (1986). Bullock was convicted of felony murder. He had held the victim's
head while his accomplice beat and killed the victim, then Bullock helped to dispose of the body. Id.
at 379. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death absent any specific finding that he killed,
intended to kill, or attempted to kill. Id. at 379-81.
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appeal. 75 Justice White, again writing for the majority, reasoned that Enmund
had imposed a "categorical rule" on the sentencing power of a state.76 Such
sentencing limits, stated the Court, "need not be enforced by the jury."' 77 Bul-
lock, Enmund, and the earlier cases provided the legal context in which to place
the bizarre facts of Tison.
On July 30, 1978, Gary Tison's three sons, Donald, Ricky, and Raymond,
entered the Arizona State Prison at Florence carrying an ice chest filled with
guns and broke their father and his cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, out of the
prison. No shots were fired throughout this incident.78 The Tisons and Greena-
walt locked the guards and visitors present in a storage closet and fled in a get-
away car. They soon abandoned the getaway car for a second vehicle, a Lincoln,
that had been parked nearby prior to the prison break.79 The group stopped at a
house where they spent two nights, during which time one tire on the Lincoln
became flat, and the only spare tire was used to replace it.a0 The group began
traveling towards Flagstaff, Arizona. 8' During the trip a second tire blew out,
and the group agreed to flag down the next passing motorists and steal their
car.8 2 Raymond stood next to the disabled car as the others hid armed in the
bushes. The Lyons family stopped to render aid.8 3
The Tison group emerged from the bushes and forced the Lyons at gun-
point out of their own car and into the Lincoln. Raymond and Donald drove
the Lincoln some distance off the main road, into the desert, with the remaining
three men following in the Lyons' car, a Mazda.8 4 When they stopped, the Ly-
ons were ordered to stand in front of the Lincoln's headlights while the Tisons'
belongings were transferred from the Lincoln to the Mazda. Money and some
guns were taken from the Lyons' possessions, the rest of which were put into the
Lincoln. 85
Under Gary Tison's direction, the Lincoln was driven a short distance fur-
ther into the desert. 86 Gary Tison fired his shotgun into the radiator of the
75. Id. at 386.
76. Id.
77. Id. Cabana resolved a distinct split between the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit had consistently interpreted Enmund as requiring a finding by the
fact-finder that the defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Bullock v. Lucas,
743 F.2d 244, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1984); Reddix v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 494, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Skillern v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Louisiana State Peniten-
tiary, 694 F.2d 75, 76-77 (5th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit held, both before and after Cabana,
that this determination could be made by the state at any level. White v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d
1478, 1481 (11th Cir. 1987); Griffin v. Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1505, 1519 (11 th Cir. 1985); Fleming v.
Kemp, 748 F.2d 1435, 1453 (1 1th Cir. 1984).





83. Id. at 1679. The family consisted of John and Donnelda Lyons, their two-year-old son and






Lincoln, completely disabling it. The Lyons were then brought again to stand in
front of the Lincoln's headlights, where John Lyons pleaded for his life and
asked for water.8 7 Gary Tison then told his sons to go back to the Mazda and
get some water, while he and Greenawalt guarded the family. All three sons
went to get water. Either while they were filling a jug at the car, or after they
had handed the water to Gary Tison,8 8 Gary Tison and Greenawalt raised their
guns and repeatedly shot the victims, killing all of them. 89 Raymond Tison later
testified:
Well, I just think you should know when we first came into this we had
an agreement with my dad that nobody would get hurt because we [the
brothers] wanted no one hurt. And when this [killing] came about we
were not expecting it. And it took us by surprise as much as it took
the family by surprise because we were not expecting this to happen. I
wish we could [have done] something to stop it, but by the time it
happened it was too late to stop it. And it's just something we are
going to live with the rest of our lives. It will always be there.90
After the killings, the group continued together into the desert. Raymond and
Ricky Tison and Randy Greenawalt were apprehended several days later.9 1
Gary Tison escaped into the desert, where he died of exposure.9 2
Raymond and Ricky Tison were tried under Arizona's felony murder93 and
87. Id.
88. The stories of Randy and Raymond Tison, petitioners, conflicted on this point. Id.
89. The Lyons family died instantly. Theresa Tyson, the Lyons' niece, died after crawling a
short distance in the desert. Id.
90. State v. (Raymond) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 462, 690 P.2d 755, 763 (1984) (Feldman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (en banc) (brackets original), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1676
(1987).
91. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1679. Donald Tison was shot while attempting to drive through a
police roadblock, and later died. Id. Donald was driving a stolen van when the group approached a
police roadblock. A. DERSHowrTz, THE BEST DEFENSE 298-99 (1982). Allan Dershowitz repre-
sented the Tison brothers in the Arizona Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
According to Raymond and Ricky, Donald attempted to crash through the roadblock, but was shot
four times by police. Id. at 298. The van came to rest, and Gary Tison yelled, "Every man for
himself!" as he ran into the desert. Id. Ricky and Raymond Tison and Randy Greenawalt threw
themselves on the ground. Id. at 198-99. The police approached the van to find Donald unconscious
but still breathing. Id. at 299. An ambulance was called, and arrived in half an hour, but the medics
were not allowed to approach Donald for five and a half hours, at which time he was dead. Id.
When the police approached the petitioners, the following allegedly occurred:
A shotgun was shoved against the back of Ricky's head. A pistol barrel was put in his
mouth. His clothes-all of them-were cut off his body with a Buck knife. He was pulled
by his hair into a police car surrounded by three officers and interrogated-naked and
shivering-for five hours. When he expressed reluctance to talk, he was asked, "Do you
want to see your dying brother?" The implication was clear: he would be shot and left to
die if he did not confess. "I don't want to make a statement," he said. The police contin-
ued the interrogation. Donald, bleeding and unconscious, would receive no medical atten-
tion until his brothers confessed. Finally, Ricky confessed to his role in the events
following the break out. Raymond was treated the same.
Id. Randy Greenawalt was later sentenced to death for the four murders. State v. Greenawalt, 128
Ariz. 388, 626 P.2d 118, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 848 (1981).
92. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1679.
93. The statute provided that a killing occurring during the perpetration of a robbery is capital
murder. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956), repealed by Act of May 31, 1977, ch. 142, § 15,
1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 687 (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
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accomplice liability statutes. 94 They were found guilty of the four murders, and
in a separate sentencing proceeding, without a jury,95 they were sentenced to
death. The trial judge found three statutory aggravating circumstances-that
the Tis6ns had created a grave risk of death to others (not the victims), that the
murders had been committed for pecuniary gain, and that the murders were
especially heinous.96 The trial judge did not find the statutory mitigating cir-
cumstance that the petitioner's "participation was relatively minor." 97 The
judge also found three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances- petitioners'
youth, their lack of prior felony records, and their conviction under the felony
murder rule. 98
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentences, reasoning that
[t]he deaths would not have occurred but for [Ricky and Raymond's]
assistance. That they did not specifically intend [the deaths], that they
did not plot in advance that these homicides would take place, or that
they did not actually pull the triggers ... is of little significance. 99
After the Enmund decision of 1982,100 the Tison brothers collaterally at-
tacked their death sentences based on the Enmund requirement that specific
intent be found before the death penalty can be imposed.10 1 The Arizona
Supreme Court agreed that "Enmund ... prohibits imposition of the death pen-
alty absent a showing that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to
kill.' 0 2 Rather than remanding to the trial court for a finding of intent, how-
ever, the Arizona Supreme Court made a finding of intent on its own, 103 despite
language in its prior opinion that no intent existed. 104 The court stated, "Intend
94. Id. § 13-139, repealed by Act of May 31, 1977, ch. 142, § 2, 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 687.
This statute provided that each participant in a robbery or kidnapping is legally responsible for the
acts of his accomplices. It is unlikely that revised statutes would have had an impact on the Tisons'
case. See id. § 13-1105(A)(2), (B) (Supp. 1987) (felony murder includes killings occurring during sex
and narcotics offenses and escape); id. §§ 13-301, -303(A)(3), -303(B)(2) (1978 & Supp. 1987).
95. Arizona law provided for a hearing without a jury. Id. § 13-454(A) (1973) (now codified at
id. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1987)). Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), held that the United States
Constitution does not require that a capital punishment decision be made by a jury.
96. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1680. For a general discussion of the last aggravating circumstance, see
Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The Standardless
Standard, 64 N.C.L. REV. 941 (1986).
97. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(f)(3) (1973) (repealed 1978).
98. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1680.
99. State v. (Ricky) Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 545, 633 P.2d 335, 354 (1981), vacated, 107 S. Ct.
1676 (1987). The court did not uphold, however, the aggravating circumstance that the defendants
had endangered the lives of people other than the victims, finding this circumstance unsupported by
the evidence. Id.
100. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
101. State v. (Raymond) Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755 (1984) (en banc), vacated, 107 S. Ct.
1676 (1987); State v. (Ricky) Tison, 142 Ariz. 446, 690 P.2d 747 (1984) (en bane), vacated, 107 S. Ct.
1676 (1987).
102. (Raymond) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690 P.2d at 757.
103. Id. The Supreme Court described the intent found by the Arizona Supreme Court as "a
species of foreseeability." Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
104. See text accompanying note 99. In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Feldman asked, "Does
the record today support what it could not support in 1981-that defendants either killed, attempted
to kill or intended that the victims be killed?" (Ricky) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 450-51, 690 P.2d at 751-52
(Feldman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 633
P.2d 335 (1981), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987)). Justice Feldman went on to state, "Even if we
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[sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant intended, contem-
plated, or anticipated that lethal force would or might be used or that life would
or might be taken in accomplishing the underlying felony." 10 5 The Arizona
Supreme Court also characterized the Tisons' involvement in the underlying fel-
ony as more substantial than that of the defendant in Enmund.10 6
On review the United States Supreme Court vacated the Arizona Supreme
Court's finding of intent, stating, "The Arizona Supreme Court's attempted re-
formulation of intent to kill amounts to little more than a restatement of the
felony murder rule itself." 10 7 Despite this, the Supreme Court upheld the impo-
sition of the death penalty on the Tison brothers, declaring the Enmund culpa-
bility requirement could be met with a showing of reckless indifference to human
life when coupled with major participation in the underlying felony. 10 8 The
Court stated that major participation had already been determined by the Ari-
zona courts.10 9 Although the case was remanded for a determination of
whether the defendants had acted with reckless indifference, the Court stated
that such a finding was supported by the record.' 10
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first discussed Enmund, arguing that
the holding in Enmund was very fact specific.' The Court stated, "The [En-
mund] Court noted that... Florida was one of only eight jurisdictions that
authorized the death penalty 'solely for participation in a robbery in which an-
other robber takes life.' 112 On that basis the Court concluded Enmund was
applicable only to "a distinct minority regime."'1 3 In contrast, the Court ex-
plained that "eight States required a finding of intent to kill.., and one State
required actual participation in the killing" before a death sentence could be
imposed for felony murder.1 14 The Court stated that Tison fell into a mid-range
of cases, "outside the category of felony murderers for whom Enmund explicitly
held the death penalty disproportional."' 1 s The Enmund decision, the Court
implied, ignored this entire mid-range of cases in which the defendant's "degree
of participation in the crimes was major rather than minor, and the record
would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to
human life."1 16 Thus, the Court stated that the true Tison issue was whether the
ignore the previous contrary conclusion, today's holding is remarkable because there is no direct
evidence that either of the brothers intended to kill ...." Id. at 451, 690 P.2d at 752 (Feldman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He concluded, "I would obey the dictate of Enmund and
require an 'individualized consideration' of . . . intent to kill as a constitutional requirement in
imposing the death sentence." Id. at 454, 690 P.2d at 755 (Feldman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Enmund 458 U.S. at 798).
105. (Ricky) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690 P.2d at 748 (citing Enmund, 453 U.S. 782).
106. Id. at 456, 690 P.2d. at 748-49.
107. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1684.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1684-85.
110. Id. at 1684.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1682 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1684.
116. Id.
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death penalty was constitutional for this mid-range of cases. 1 17
The Court concluded that in this mid-range, not only did "the majority of
American jurisdictions clearly authorize capital punishment," but that Ameri-
can courts were not "nearly so reluctant to impose death" as they had been in
cases like Enmund.118 The Court then described an "apparent consensus" in
actual court decisions since Enmund that "substantial participation in a violent
felony under circumstances likely to result in ... loss of. .. life may justify the
death penalty even absent an 'intent to kill.' "119 In support of this consensus
the Court cited six state decisions.120
The Court next evaluated the proportionality of the death penalty for this
new category of cases.' 2' The Court's proportionality review considered the
culpability of one exhibiting "extreme indifference to human life.' 122 While
noting the traditional legal theory that culpability is proportionately related to
intent or purposefulness, the Court adopted the stance that "some noninten-
tional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all."'1 23
The Court concluded that because culpability for reckless indifference was equal
to culpability for intent to kill, inflicting the death penalty on these mid-range
felony murderers was not beyond the bounds of the constitution. 124 The Court
again characterized the prohibition of capital punishment absent an intent to kill
as the "minority position," not one that is constitutionally required.' 25
The Tison Court premised its holding on the conclusion that the Enmund
rule was limited to that minority of jurisdictions authorizing the imposition of
the death penalty on those convicted of capital murder on the felony murder
doctrine alone, without any showing of substantial participation in the underly-
ing felony or of any culpable mental state.12 6 The Court based this conclusion
on the language of Enmund and the Court's own survey of state statutes regard-
ing death penalty and felony murder.127 The Court also noted six cases since
Enmund in which juries had actually imposed the death penalty on felony mur-
der defendants who actively participated in the underlying felony-regardless of
a showing of intent. 128 Examined individually, however, all three of these bases
are faulty.
The Enmund opinion specifically phrased the issue it sought to address as
117. Id. at 1685 ("Enmund does not specifically address this point.").
118. Id. at 1687.
119. Id. at 1686.
120. Id. at 1686-87 (citing Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1051 (1984); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1589 (1987);
Ruffin v. State, 420 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1982); Allen v. State, 253 Ga. 390, 321 S.E.2d 710 (1984), cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); People v. Davis, 95 Il1. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1001 (1983); Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc).
121. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1687.




126. Id. at 1684.
127. Id. at 1683-84.
128. Id. at 1686-87; see cases cited supra note 120.
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"whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take
life." 129 The Court stated that it was unnecessary to deal with the question
whether the "degree of Enmund's participation in the killings was given the
consideration required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 130 Dis-
missing the issue of degree of participation summarily implied that Enmund's
prohibition was not limited, as the Tison Court stated, to only those cases in
which the defendant is a "minor actor" in the felony. Rather, the Enmund
Court's sole focus on the defendant's intent implied that without intent, even a
high degree of participation in the underlying felony would be insufficient to
warrant the death penalty.131
Another indicator that the Enmund Court had no intention to restrict its
ruling to felony murder alone was the resurrection in its discussion of Coker,132
which categorically prohibited the death penalty for the crime of rape. 133 Com-
paring Enmund to Coker, the Enmund Court stated, "In reaching this conclu-
sion . . . the [Coker] Court looked to the historical development of the
punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sen-
tencing decisions juries have made.... We proceed to analyze the punishment
at issue in this case in a similar manner."' 134 The Enmund Court then set out its
own statistical analysis, finding that "only about a third of American jurisdic-
tions would ever permit a defendant who somehow participated in a robbery in
which a killing occurred to be sentenced to die." 135 Comparing its survey of
state statutes with that in Coker, the Enmund Court concluded:
While the current legislative judgment with respect to the imposition
of the death penalty where a defendant did not take life, attempt to
take it, or intend to take life is neither "wholly unanimous. . ." nor as
compelling as the legislative judgments considered in Coker, it never-
theless weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime
at issue. 136
The Enmund Court's marked reliance on Coker implies a similarity of purpose
for the Enmund Court: it meant to categorically prohibit the death penalty for
those defendants who neither "killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill." 137
129. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787. Not only did the Court phrase the issue broadly at the outset,
but it continued to use similarly broad language throughout the opinion.
130. Id. at 787 n.4.
131. The issue of Enmund's participation was not as settled as the Tison opinion suggests. In the
Tison opinion Justice O'Connor describes Enmund's participation as "attenuated," Tison, 107 S. Ct.
at 1683, while in her dissent in Enmund, the Justice stated that "[Enmund's] participation had not
been 'relatively minor,' but had been major in that he 'planned the capital felony and actively partici-
pated in an attempt to avoid detection by disposing of the murder weapons.'" Enmund, 458 U.S. at
806 (quoting Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1373 (Fla. 1981) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
134. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89.
135. Id. at 793.
136. Id. at 792-93 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596).
137. The Enmund opinion did use other phrases to describe this class of defendants, thus caus-
ing potential confusion. Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-Trigger-
man, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857, 859 (1985). The Court described the class of defendants at issue as
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Enmund also mirrored Coker when evaluating the proportionality of the
crime of felony murder and the "enormity" of the death penalty. The Enmund
Court stated, "The murderer kills, the robb6r, if no more than that, does not.
... As was said of the crime of rape in Coker, we have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty ... is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such,
does not take human life." 138 Justice White's own description of Enmund in the
majority opinion in Cabana v. Bullock shows it is not the narrow rule described
by the Tison Court. Justice White stated: "Enmund imposes a categorical rule:
a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing
take place or that lethal force be used may not be sentenced to death."'139
The Tison Court also based its narrow construction of Enmund on its own
statistical survey of which state legislatures have permitted the death penalty in
felony murder cases in which the defendant actively participated in the underly-
ing felony. The Court found that four states authorized the death penalty in
felony murder cases on a showing of recklessness or extreme indifference to
human life.14o Two more allowed the death penalty when the defendant's par-
ticipation had been substantial.141 Six states, including Arizona, allowed the
death penalty for felony murder but counted as a mitigating circumstance minor
participation in the felony.142 Three additional states permitted the death pen-
alty for felony murder when an aggravating circumstance had been found. 143
To these fifteen jurisdictions the Court added six jurisdictions that still permitted
the death penalty in violation of the Court's own reading of Enmund; that is,
based on felony murder simpliciter. 144 With these twenty-one jurisdictions the
Tison Court concluded that the majority of American jurisdictions clearly au-
thorize capital punishment for these mid-range felony murders.14 5 In conclud-
ing that twenty-one jurisdictions constituted a majority, the Court apparently
considered only those states which permit the penalty of death in any case.
"defendant[s] who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred." Enmund, 458
U.S. at 792. The Court also cited statistics regarding defendants "who did not participate in a plot
or scheme to murder." Id. at 795. The Court once described the defendant with which it dealt as
"one... who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others, but
who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be
employed." Id. at 797. The court five times specified the class of defendants at issue simply as those
who have neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended that a killing take place. Id. at 787, 793, 797
798, 800. This repetition demonstrates the Court's consistency in defining the class of defendants for
which it has prohibited the death penalty.
138. Id. at 797. The Coker Court had stated, "The murderer kills, the rapist, if no more than
that, does not." Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
139. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986) (emphasis added). Intending that lethal force
be employed, while vague, must mean more than the threat of force or the brandishing of a weapon,
because certainly those elements were present in Enmund. Moreover, the words chosen by the En-
round Court indicate that it contemplated the opposite of a threat. "That lethal force be employed"
provokes the image of one actively inflicting physical harm on another. Note, supra note 137, at
870.
140. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1685.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1685-86.
143. Id. at 1686.
144. Id. at 1685-86.
145. Id. at 1687.
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The Court included in this "majority" two states, California and Arizona,
whose courts, if not legislatures, had clearly interpreted Enmund to require a
finding of intent when imposing the death penalty on nontriggerman felony mur-
derers.1 46 The Court dismissed these cases, claiming the decisions to be the re-
sult of "perceived federal constitutional limitations stemming from our then
recent decision in Edmund [sic]."' 14 7 The Court also listed Kentucky as one of
the states "authoriz[ing] the death penalty in felony murder cases upon a show-
ing of culpable mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to
human life."' 48 This statement is questionable, however, because Kentucky has
abolished the felony murder rule. 149 Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out that
"the Court exclude[d] from its survey those jurisdictions that have abolished the
death penalty and those that have authorized it only in circumstances different
from those presented here."150 With these jurisdictions included, Brennan ar-
gued, "three-fifths of American jurisdictions do not authorize the death penalty
for a nontriggerman absent a finding that he intended to kill.' 15'
The third part of the Tison Court's analysis was a survey, as in Coker and
Enmund, of how often courts had actually imposed a death sentence in cases
similar to Tison. The Court cited six cases in support of its reading of Enmund
and concluded that portion of its opinion.1 52 The Tison Court largely ignored
Enmund's statistical analysis in this area. As of 1982 only six executions out of
the 362 since 1954 involved a nontriggerman felony murderer.' 53 Of the 739
inmates on death row in 1982, only forty-one had not participated in the fatal
assault.15 4 Justice Brennan noted that the failure to treat this aspect of the avail-
able facts was "troubling not simply because of what that examination would
have revealed, but because until today such an examination has been treated as
constitutionally required" by Coker and Enmund.155
The Court also failed to refute or distinguish any of the decisions interpret-
ing Enmund as a prohibition of the death penalty when the defendant had not
exhibited an intent to kill and had not killed, regardless of his or her level of
146. (Raymond) Tison, 142 Ariz. at 456, 690 P.2d at 758; Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d
131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
147. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1686 n.8.
148. Id. at 1685 n.5.
149. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984). Kentucky does
have a statute under which reckless conduct, "[i]ncluding, but not limited to the operation of a
motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life," may be punish-
able with death. Id. § 507.020 (1)(b)-(c). This crime is quite different from that in the Tison case,
under which a jury may convict a defendant of first degree murder on the felony murder rule alone,
and a higher level state court may find the requisite level of intent for inflicting the death penalty. In
Kentucky the finding of recklessness necessary for a conviction would have to be made by the jury as
an element of the offense.
150. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1697 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens in this dissent).
151. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1686-87; cases cited supra note 120.
153. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794. Sixty-five executions took place between Enmund and Tison.
None of those executed were nontriggerman felony murderers. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1698 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
154. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796.
155. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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participation in the underlying felony or presence during the killing. A number
of both state and federal courts have interpreted Enmund as mandating that the
defendant either participate directly in the killing or personally have an intent to
commit murder before the death penalty can be imposed. 156 Many of these
cases involved defendants who had more fully participated in the underlying
felony than did Enmund. In Hyman v. Aiken, 157 for example, the defendant
conceived the robbery, laid in wait for the victims, mounted an assault on the
victim's trailerhouse, and terrorized the victims.' 58 Whether the defendant or
his accomplices actually delivered the fatal blow was unclear. 159 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that because the jury could
have sentenced the defendant to death absent the required finding that "he
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill the robbery victim," the death pen-
alty must be reversed despite the defendant's high level of participation. 160
In death penalty cases the United States Supreme Court has routinely made
its own analysis of the proportionality of the death penalty to the crime at issue,
independent of state legislatures and state court holdings. 16 1 In capital cases,
the individual's culpability is given especially close attention.1 62 The Enmund
156. E.g., Hyman v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938, 940 (4th Cir. 1985) (incorrect jury instruction allowed
jury to sentence defendant to death "whether or not he killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill");
Fleming v. Kemp, 748 F.2d 1435, 1453-54 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (Georgia statute requiring a finding of
malice complied with Enmund); Chancy v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1356 n.29 (10th Cir.) ("Before a
death penalty can be imposed it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
killed or attempted to kill the victim, or himself intended or contemplated that the victim's life
would be taken."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1012 (5th Cir.
1982) ("In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that under the eighth amendment a death sentence
may not be imposed on someone who neither committed the homicide, attempted to commit the
homicide, nor participated in the plot to kill the victim."); Hall v. State, 420 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla.
1982) ("Enmund was an aider and abettor only to the underlying felony. Hall, on the other hand,
was an aider and abettor to the homicide as well as the underlying felony."); People v. Tiller, 94 I1.
2d 303, 323-24, 447 N.E.2d 174, 185 (1982) ("[D]efendant was not shown to have planned or in any
manner participated in the killings, and under the authority of Enmund the death sentences must be
vacated."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refuted the argument that the Enmund rule was fact-specific, stating:
The State would ... distinguish Enmund on its facts. Enmund drove a get-away car ....
[The present defendant] was.. . physically present at the scene of the killing. The distinc-
tion is without a difference, however, for like Enmund, [the defendant] himself has not
been shown to have killed or intended to kill. His presence at the scene supports no such
inference.
Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805, 812 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984).
157. 777 F.2d 938 (4th Cir. 1985).
158. Hyman v. Aiken, 606 F. Supp. 1046, 1049-50 (D.S.C.), rev'd, 777 F.2d 938 (4th Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 1049-50.
160. Hyman, 777 F.2d at 940.
161. Eg., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("[I]t is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth
Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund... who does not...
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force.., be employed."); Coker,
433 U.S. at 597 ("[R]ecent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries
do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) ("[Plublic perceptions of stan-
dards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord
with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' ") (quot-
ing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) ("When a defendant's life is at stake, the Court
has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is reserved.")
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Court, however, noted that the felony murder doctrine allowed conviction with-
out a finding of intent, and thus without any individualized jury determination
regarding the defendant's mental state. Because it considered such a determina-
tion essential to capital sentencing, the Enmund Court ruled that in order to
sentence the felony murder defendant to death the sentencer must make a find-
ing of nontriggerman intent, focusing on the defendant's "personal responsibility
and moral guilt."'16 3
Relying on Gregg, the Enmund Court noted two acceptable goals of capital
punishment--deterrence and retribution. 164 If neither of these goals is realized
then the penalty is "nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering."' 165 Without intent to kill, which is commonly considered
to establish the highest degree of culpability, it is questionable that the death
penalty, the most extreme form of retribution, is proportionate. 166 As for deter-
rence, the Enmund Court made clear that only those who premeditate and delib-
erate can be deterred.' 67 The Court stated "if a person does not intend that life
will be taken, or that lethal force will be employed by others, the possibility that
the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious felony murder will not 'enter into
the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.' ,68
The Tison Court did not consider the relationship of the death penalty im-
posed in Tison to the goals of deterrence and retribution. The Tison Court's
entire proportionality analysis centered on the relative culpability of one exhibit-
ing reckless indifference towards life. 169 In its analysis the Court recognized the
traditional principle that the more purposeful an individual's conduct, the
greater her culpability.170 The Court adopted the stance, however, that "some
nonintentional murders may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of
all."' 7 1 The Court exemplified this principle with
the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or
dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery,
utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unin-
tended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's
property. 172
Justice Brennan's dissent points out the attenuated nature of this discussion
with regard to the facts at hand. First, both examples provided by the majority
describe one who actually inflicted the fatal blow on the victim.' 73 Using exam-
163. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. Cabana modified this rule, and allows an appellate court to
make a finding of intent. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386-89 (1986).
164. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187).
165. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
166. Loewy, supra note 70, at 312-14.
167. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99 (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
168. Id. at 799 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
169. See Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1688.
170. Id. at 1687-88.
171. Id. at 1688.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1694 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ples so easily distinguishable from the case at hand hardly comports with the
requirement that the proportionality test in a capital case reflect the individual
culpability of the defendant, given the circumstances of the crime and the crimi-
nal. The Court offered no particularized analysis of the culpability of one who
neither inflicts death on another nor intends the victim's death, but who never-
theless may have acted recklessly. "It is precisely in this context-where the
defendant has not killed-that a finding that he or she nevertherless intended to
kill seems indispensable to establishing capital culpability." 174
The Tison Court entirely omitted analysis of whether the individuals in
question, the Tison brothers, deserved the death penalty. The Court simply con-
cluded that the record supported a finding of reckless indifference due to the
brothers' participation in the escape and kidnapping. 175 Justice Brennan con-
tended that even accepting the reckless indifference standard, evidence in the
record was insufficient to establish that the Tisons exhibited this mental state,
and in fact, positive evidence contradicted such a finding.' 7 6 The brothers had
conditioned their participation in the prison escape on their father's promise that
no one would be hurt. 177 No one was hurt at the prison breakout, indicating the
promise would be kept.178 Both the act of shooting out the radiator and procur-
ing water for the Lyons family indicated that the Tison brothers reasonably ex-
pected that the Lyons family would merely be left immobilized, with water, to
give the group time to escape. In that light the defendants' claim that the kill-
ings were surprising is plausible, and no evidence refuted this story. Instead, the
fact the murders were not necessary to the overall escape was considered by the
trial court as an aggravating factor against the Tisons. 179 Experts testified that
the brothers were "over their heads" in the venture, strengthening the implica-
tion that they did not appreciate the consequences of their act.180
In her dissent in Enmund Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's intent
requirement as "crudely crafted."'18 The requirement that the defendant act
with "reckless indifference" towards human life is equally crude. It is entirely
unclear what exactly is meant by this standard, and as a result, wide latitude has
been given to the states in this area. "Reckless indifference," for example, might
be used to denote a depraved heart, as in depraved heart murder. Several states
also have "depraved indifference" statutes, which often concern beating or starv-
ing deaths. However, this offense commonly constitutes only second-degree
murder or some other lesser offense. 182 The Model Penal Code uses the phrase
"under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1684 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1692-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1678.
179. Id. at 1691 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1693 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 635 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201 (Cum. Supp.
1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1978).
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life" in describing depraved heart murder.'l 3 Other questions arise in applying
the Court's standard: Must the defendant be subjectively aware of the risk that
is being created? How high must the risk be? Must the defendant risk more than
one life?184
If depraved heart murder is not what the Tison Court alludes to, more con-
fusion exists. The term "recklessness" is fraught with a variety of meanings. At
one level, it simply means that "the defendant's conduct must involve a greater
risk of harm to others than tort negligence requires."' 85 The term also can
mean that, although the same risk of harm as in tort is involved, the defendant
must subjectively realize the risk of harm. In contrast, tort liability can be based
on objective expectation.18 6 The term "recklessness" has also been used to de-
note the inadvertent creation of a high degree of risk. 187
Not only is the Court's new language likely to lead to disparate applications
among the states, but the standard also is inconsistent with a major principle of
Furman and recognized in Enmund. Inherent in Enmund's requirement of an
individualized consideration of culpability is the idea that the death penalty,
typically a punishment reserved for first-degree murder, should not be inflicted
on one whose level of culpability is not equivalent to that of other death penalty
recipients. Thus, Enmund prohibited using the element of participation in the
felony to supply the intent requirement for first-degree murder at the sentencing
stage. Tison again makes possible the disparity in culpability between capitally
sentenced murderers and capitally sentenced felony murderers. In most juris-
dictions one who commits a depraved heart murder is not considered to have
committed a crime for which the death penalty may be imposed.' 88 Yet with
Tison's new standard, one who actively participates in a felony with a mind state
similar to that of the depraved heart murderer, but who does not actually kill,
may receive the death penalty. This result is what Enmund sought to avoid-
the defendant's participation in the felony supplying the intent requirement, and
thus the requisite culpability, for first-degree murder at the sentencing stage.
The Tison Court further confuses the issue by collapsing the element of a
high level of participation in the underlying felony into the reckless indifference
element. The Court does this by stating, "These requirements significantly over-
lap . . . , for the greater the defendant's participation in the felony murder, the
more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life."' 1 9 The
Model Penal Code similarly states that, for an ordinary finding of reckless indif-
183. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (1980) (emphasis added). A significant minority of
modem codes do not recognize depraved heart murder. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 7.4, at 618 (2d ed. 1986).
184. The Model Penal Code requires subjective realization of the risk being created. MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c), 210.2 (1980). The term "indifference" connotes a subjective disregard of
the risk.
185. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 183, § 3.7, at 232.
186. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 183, § 3.7, at 232.
187. Commonwealth v. WVelansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944).
188. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 183, § 7.7(d), at 648. "Less defensible is placing even
depraved heart murder into [the first-degree murder] category, as a few states have done." Id.
189. Tison, 107 S. Ct. at 1685.
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ference, the prosecution must prove that the defendant consciously created a
risk that was substantial and unjustifiable. When felony murder is concerned,
however, "[s]uch recklessness and indifference are presumed" when the actor is
a party to a dangerous felony. 190 Collapsing the issues in this way endangers the
individualized consideration of culpability required in death penalty cases. If a
jury or a court is told that a high level of participation indicates "reckless indif-
ference," the two issues become one. Thus, the factfinder is relieved of the bur-
den of making the more difficult, and usually more crucial, determination of
mind state or subjective awareness, and thus culpability. This aggravates the
problem of disparity in culpability between capitally sentenced murderers and
capitally sentenced felony murderers. The danger of letting a high degree of
participation supply the requisite culpability results in what Enmund de-
nounced-making it a capital crime to participate actively in a felony in which a
homicide occurs, regardless of individual culpability.
Whether one accepts the penalty of death as a valid punishment for this
nation's courts to impose, its application in the Tison case presents several logi-
cal difficulties. Not only is the standard "reckless indifference towards human
life" vague and difficult to apply with consistency, but it does not square with
the careful precedent provided in Coker, Woodson, Lockett, and, most notably,
Enmund. Those cases mandated that a careful proportionality analysis be con-
ducted by the Supreme Court when permitting the death penalty for a category
of crime, as well as an individualized proportionality analysis in any given impo-
sition of the death penalty. That Tison fell short of both these requirements is
demonstrated in Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Booth,191 decided a short
time after Tison. 'In Booth the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the intro-
duction of victim impact statements at the sentencing stage in those jurisdictions
authorizing the death penalty.192 The Court stated that these statements inter-
fered with the jury's individualized determination of the defendant's "personal
responsibility and moral guilt" which is necessary before imposing the death
penalty. 193 Because many of the victims are unknown to their assailants, the
Court declared victim impact statements "'constitutionally impermissible or to-
tally irrelevant to the sentencing process.' -194
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (1980). This presumption can be rebutted, and the prose-
cution still bears "the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted
recklessly and with extreme indifference." Id. § 210.2(b) Comment 6, at 30. The Model Penal Code
further states that:
the jury may... regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the
required culpability unless the court determines that the evidence as a whole clearly nega-
tives that conclusion. The presumption may, of course, be rebutted by the defendant or
may simply not be followed by the jury.
Id.
That the presumption may be rebutted is not effective in keeping the issue of participation
separate from that of recklessness in felony murder sentencing. The requisite finding of recklessness
can be made by an upper level court, as per Cabana, and is thus less likely to be given the high level
of scrutiny required for an element of an offense.
191. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
192. Id. at 2536.
193. Id. at 2532-33 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801).
194. Id. at 2533 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)).
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Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the amount of harm caused by a defend-
ant should be considered in the sentencing phase of capital murder.1 9 5 He also
argued that this is often done. 196 Scalia wrote:
Less than two months ago, we held that two brothers who planned and
assisted in their father's escape from prison could be sentenced to
death because in the course of the escape the father and an accomplice
murdered a married couple and two children .... Had their father
allowed the victims to live, the brothers could not be put to death; but
because he decided to kill, the brothers may. The difference between
the life and death for these two defendants was thus a matter "wholly
unrelated to the[ir] blameworthiness."' 197
Honesty like Scalia's was lacking in the Tison opinion. Rather than admit that
the Court focused on the harm committed by Gary Tison, the father of the
defendants, the Court invoked a contrived distinction between Eninund and Ti-
son. The distinction between minor and major participation melts when one
examines Justice O'Connor's detailed account of Enmund's active involvement
in his crime. The purported consistency between the two cases ignores the plain
meaning of the Enmund Court's rule that condemning to death the defendant
who "neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life" violates
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.1 98
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195. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787, 801.
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